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Contextual Theology without Ulterior Motives
Martien E. Brinkman
THE CONTEXTUAL, REMEMBERED  JESUS
It is not simple to write about contextual theology in relation to the theme of this volume: 
religion without ulterior motives. In current contextual theology the strength of this form 
of theology is, after all, correctly seen in its embeddedness in and contribution to an 
existing culture.  Of course, this does not imply an uncritical adoption of that culture, but 
a form of adaptation will certainly always be discussed.  Otherwise, there is only a hostile 
confrontation. So, the point of issue is always the role which religion can play in a certain 
culture. Is that the same as the ‘instrumentalization’ Bram van de Beek is blaming 
liberation theology for in his article on ‘Religion without ulterior motive’? That will be 
the main question to be answered in this contribution: What is the role of the context in 
contextual theology?1
The question of the extent that the Gospel can be embedded in an existing culture 
is greatly complicated by the fact that we cannot begin from a cultureless starting point or
from a cultureless Gospel. There was never a ‘pure Gospel’. The New Testament itself is 
an example of contextual theology.  It is not conceivable without the cultural attire of the 
Jewish, Greek and Roman culture of the beginning of our era. So, in a certain sense, the 
only thing we can do is to compare two kinds of contextual theology.
Everything we know about Jesus, we know from contempories who were deeply 
impressed by him and, hence, reported about his impact upon them. Later on, they wrote 
down their memories and transmitted them to the next generations. And again later on, the 
early church gathered these scriptural sources and accepted finally quite a number of them 
as the New Testament canon after an extended process of selection during more than two 
                                               
1 The first pages of this contribution refer to our ‘Introduction’ in a monography on the ‘Non-
Western Jesus’ to be published in the Spring of 2007. 
centuries. A final word about the criteria for selection has never been spoken. Until now, 
the discussion continues within Christianity about the exact number and the faithfulness 
of the transmitted sources. Therefore, the Jesus we know from the New Testament, is the 
remembered Jesus, remembered by contemporaries and later generations of Christians.2
All the names given to Jesus in the New Testament—rabbi, prophet, royal 
messiah, king of the Jews, Christ, healer, exorcist, son of God, son of Man, high priest, 
savior, Word, light of the world, Truth, etc.—were well-known religious names in 
Palestine. All of them have a Jewish or Greek background. The creative application of 
existing religious names, therefore, already forms the basis of the New Testament imagery 
about Jesus. With the help of these names, his audience, and later on his readers, could 
give him ‘his place’ in their lives.3 Already in Jesus’ lifetime some of these names were 
contested. The names of Messiah and son of God were especially objects of vehement 
disputes (Mt.16: 13-20 and John 4: 1-41). Often the names were applied in such a manner
that their meaning underwent a considerable transformation.4
Many theologians recognize the role of influences from ‘abroad’ in the 
transmission of the Gospel, but deny the ongoing character of this process of 
inculturation. In their eyes it was a unique event that was guided by the Holy Spirit. The 
Holy Spirit guided this process of inculturation only once. That process is definitely fixed 
in the Bible. We do not share that opinion. The inculturation of the Gospel cannot be 
limited to one period in church history. That would be arbitrary. After the decisions of the 
early church about the content of the New Testament, the church continued to make 
important decisions at the councils of Nicea (325) en Chalcedon (451). Historically, these 
councils were as important as the decisions about the content of the New Testament. 
Often it is admitted that the first doctrines of the early church were also guided by 
the Holy Spirit. So, the work of the Holy Spirit in the church did not stop after the 
                                               
2J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered (Christianity in the Making, Vol. I) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2003), 130-132 and 881-893.
3K.H. Ohlig, Fundamentalchristologie. Im Spannungsfeld von Christentum und Kultur. (München: 
Kosel, 1986), 620-621.
decisions about the New Testament canon. It may have been extended to the councils of 
Nicaea and Chalcedon as well. That extension, however, confronts us immediately with 
the question: Did the Holy Spirit stop its guiding role in church history at any time? 
This is a more urgent question when we admit that these councils were definitely 
not spiritual climaxes in the decision making processes of the early church! Especially at 
Chalcedon, there was a lot of ‘power play’ from the side of Pope Leo I and Emperor 
Marcian. Ulterior motives (!) played an important role.5
Many theologians are yet reluctant to extend the work of the Spirit to the whole of 
church history. They are inclined to make some exceptions for certain periods in church 
history and grant these periods a special position. Orthodox theologians are especially 
inclined to treat the main councils of the first seven centuries preferentially. They regard 
them as the constitutive councils of the ‘undivided’ church. And hence, they earn a special 
position: unique acts of the early church. Orthodox theologians are fully aware of the 
great impact of the Greek context upon the early Christian doctrines. They consider that 
impact, however, not to be a drawback, but rather a benefit.6   
In the end, the opposite approach of most Protestant theologians leads remarkably 
to the same position. They also do not express a critical attitude over against the role of 
culture in the early transmission process of the Gospel. They do not sanctify—as the 
Orthodox do—a certain period of church history, but deny the role of the context, in this 
case of Greek culture. They stress the impact of the New Testament witness so strongly
that they actually play down the role of (Greek) culture. The early Christian doctrines 
derive their value, according to these Protestant theologians, not from their historically 
constitutive character, but from their authentically biblical character. So, the New 
                                                                                                                                
4  J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 653-554.
5A. Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche. Von der Apostolischen Zeit bis zum 
Konzil von Chalcedon (451), Vol. I. (Freiburg: Herder, [1979] 2004 – paperb. ed. of the 3th. pr.of 
1990), 753-754 and Vol. II/1, 107-220 and J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines. (London: A. & 
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6Cf. S.S. Harakas, “Must God remain Greek?” The Ecumenical Review 43 (1991) 194-199.
Testament defied the Greek context. It was more in spite of than due to Greek culture that 
the Gospel could pursue its influence. 
Both approaches do not ask the question of whether or not the Greek culture, 
embodied in the early Christian doctrines as well as in the New Testament itself, could 
have played a constraining role with regard to the proclamation of the Gospel. In contrast 
to these two approaches we would plea for a more critical attitude. It is necessary also to 
account for the role of culture in the New Testament. We have to critically analyze the 
role of culture in the manner that the New Testament authors wrote down their memories 
of Jesus. And, of course, the same holds true for the church fathers as well. From the very 
beginning of the proclamation of the Gospel, we have to underscore that the Gospel is a 
‘strange’ Gospel. We have to emphasize its ‘over against’ character. ‘Over against’ every 
culture—the Greek culture as well. 
Hence, we have not only to inquire what has been transmitted, but also what has 
been lost by the cultural constraints of the New Testament and early church era. The then 
‘translator’ might have been also a ‘traitor’, like the French proverb ‘traduire est trahir’ 
taught us. No culture can be the pure bearer of the Gospel. Ulterior motives always play
their role. Therefore, each culture can also be a hindrance for the proclamation of the 
Gospel. 
So, the inculturation of the Gospel in the Greek-Hellenistic culture might have 
been a straitjacket as well—a straitjacket that has hidden some aspects of the Gospel or at 
least minimalized their importance. A renowned scholar as Alois Grillmeier, author of 
five extensive volumes on the enduring meaning of the council of Chalcedon, places this 
point as an open question high on his list of topics to be dealt with in every current 
evaluation of Chalcedon.7
SUGGESTIONS FOR DEFINITIONS
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The above-mentioned issue is also of great importance for the evaluation of the role of the 
cultural context in topical contextual theologies. Again, the critical question about its 
impact has to be asked. It concerns the question about ulterior, external motives. In every 
culture the question must be asked anew about what the death and resurrection of Jesus 
concretely mean for that culture.  In this contribution we approach this question from the 
position that the continuity and discontinuity that is spoken about in Christian baptism 
supplies the outstanding pattern from which we can speak about the characteristics of the 
Christian faith in the midst of a number of various contexts. In this regard, we fully agree 
with Bram van de Beek’s emphasis on the meaning of baptism as main characteristic of 
Christian life.8 In the elaboration of the impact of baptismal renewal in our topical life, the 
differences between us will be exposed.   
Before we further develop our own position, we must first consider a few 
definitions.  We shall consider a three-part definition of religion. By religion we 
understand the existentially experienced focus on an, our empirical existence 
transcending, (whether or not personally understood) force field (1) that influences 
thought and action, (2) and through which communal symbols, rituals and myths receive 
meaning (3). This definition of religion is not exclusively Christian. It offers a framework 
wherein the world religions can specifically be placed.9 In the case of Christianity, the 
personal character of the relation to God will be underscored. From this definition it is 
clear that religion will always have a cultural form of expression. 
This brings us to our definition of culture as well. By culture, we understand a 
broad system of meaning, norms and values with which people can give sense to their 
existence in a particular form in a particular time. A culture is, therefore, always bound 
                                               
8A. van de Beek, Hier beneden is het niet. Christelijke toekomstverwachting. (Zoetermeer: 
Meinema, 2005), 53-63.
9There is no point in mentioning literature with regard to definitions of religion. There are too 
many. In the definition mentioned above, we intend to integrate the existential, cognitive, ethical, 
communal and symbolic aspects of religion. To its core belongs the concentration on an our 
empirical existence transcending (personal) power. 
to a time and place and contains all aspects of the human existence.10  In fact, we handle 
this idea of culture as a synonym for understanding context.
When we now place the question of the character of religious motives in relation
to the modern notion of contextual theology, it involves the question of how we can judge 
the transition of the Gospel from one context—for example, the Western context—to 
another context—for example, a non-Western context.  It thus involves the search for 
criteria for the transition of the one inculturation into the other. That brings us to a third 
definition. Under a religious inculturation process we understand the transfer of one 
particular, culturally formed religious concept and value pattern to another culture with 
its own religious concept and value pattern.
THE MEANING  OF BAPTISM
To cut every reproach of quietism off in advance, we begin our exposition of the meaning 
of Christian baptism with a consideration of the ‘activist’ aspect of baptism.  The 
consideration shall by itself—so we hope to show—lead to a plea for an even stronger 
honoring of the receptive and receiving aspect of baptism. Like Bram van de Beek, we are 
inclined to stress the renewal character of baptism. However, more than he does, we plea 
for a concept of baptism in which the ethical aspects are not considered in competition to 
the honor dedicated to God alone, the Gloria dei, but as integral part of that honor. Ethical 
aspects are not additional aspects with regard to the love of God, but the most authentic 
way to express this love. 
Our wedding text in 1972 was I John 3: 17 and 18 where John mentions the 
example of a person who has enough money in order to live; sees his brother in need and 
closes his heart against him. Then John asks: “How can it be said that the divine love 
dwells in him?” And then he continues, saying: “My children, love must not be a matter 
                                               
10Again, there is no use mentioning the many definitions of culture. In our definition, we intend  to 
integrate the existential, cognitive, ethical, communal and symbolic aspects of culture. We use a 
broad definition in which culture encompasses not only the world of art and science, but also the 
world of politics and economics. 
of words or talk; it must be genuine, and show itself in action.” Time and again Matthew 
also makes clear what Soli Dei Gloria means: “Anything you did for one of my brothers 
here, however humble, you did for me” (25: 40). 
Of course, Van de Beek knows these Bible quotations as well. In his article he 
repeatedly indicates that faith has ethical consequences, and that it is interested in material 
and social issues. It sounds, however, like an admission. In his text, these admissions are 
often immediately followed by admonitions not to make the ethical aspects the core of our 
faith. Although Van de Beek’s warnings not to ‘intrumentalize’ religion are impressive, 
convincing and highly needed, we are yet afraid that he runs the risk to suffer the opposite 
pitfall; namely, of a sterile faith. What would be his main arguments to avoid such a 
pitfall? 
I am sure he too will insist that our faith has to be salt to the world (Matt.5:13). 
That’s an allusion to an active societal role of the believers. Is it not also true that Jesus, in 
the Sermon on the Mount, not only is blessing passive aspects of Christian life, but active 
(showing mercy, making peace) as well (Matthew 5: 1-10)? When Jesus speaks in this 
section about those who suffer “for my sake,” it is clear that he equates this sake with “the 
cause of right”(10-11). In order to overcome the artificial contrast between the passive 
and active aspects of Christian life, we shall plea for a more balanced approach of the 
theology of baptism in the remainder of this contribution.11
Baptism as the God-given possibility for a change of life is pre-eminently “the 
sacramental bond of unity” among Christians, to quote No.22 of the Decree on 
Ecumenism of Vatican II.12  More than anything else, it is this reliance on the gift of the 
renewal of life that creates solidarity among the faithful. Through baptism Christians are 
buried and resurrected in Christ. Thus in Paul’s time, it apparently relativized social 
                                               
11This theology of baptism is broader developed in chapter 3 (“The Reborn Person”) of our The 
Tragedy of Human Freedom. The Failure and Promise of the Christian Concept of Freedom in 
Western Culture (Currents of Encounter, Vol.20) (Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2003), 61-83. 
12 Cf. N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, II: Trent to Vatican II (London: 
Sheed and Ward, 1990), 919 (‘Decree on Ecumenism’, 908-920).
differences and therefore, to this day in the history of Christianity, it is still a powerful 
stimulus for social action that overcomes discrimination.
In this way the term ‘resurrection’, which occurs frequently in the liturgy of 
baptism, can also literally imply resurrection to new life. That is why the well-known 
Lima text of the World Council of Churches on baptism, eucharist and ministry states in 
the chapter on baptism:
By baptism, Christians are immersed in the liberating death of Christ where 
their sins are buried, where the “old Adam” is crucified with Christ, and where 
the power of sin is broken. Thus those baptized are no longer slaves to sin, but 
free. Fully identified with the death of Christ, they are buried with him and are 
raised here and now to a new life in the power of the resurrection of Jesus 
Christ, confident that they will also ultimately be one with him in a 
resurrection like his (Rom. 6:3-11; Col. 2:13, 3:1; Eph. 2:5-6).13
The last clause of this quotation (“confident that they ”) shows that the Christian idea of 
renewal of life not only indirectly refers to the first aporia concerning the Stoic view of 
freedom—i.e. the question of how spiritual freedom relates to actual freedom—but also 
seeks to provide an answer to the second aporia, i.e. the question of how the inevitability 
of death relates to the human experience of freedom. By connecting the death and 
resurrection of a believer so emphatically with ‘dying and rising with Christ’ through 
baptism and by linking the experience of freedom with exactly this experience of 
identification, death and resurrection are experienced in the present, from which his own 
future death can be placed in another, less threatening perspective. Death may then be 
spoken about in the past tense even during one’s lifetime: “when we were dead” 
(Ephesians 2:5). On the basis of this connection one may even defy death: “Death, where 
is your victory? Death, where is your sting?” (1 Corinthians 15:55), and the confident 
expectation may be uttered that “neither death not life, no angel, no prince, nothing that 
exists, nothing still to come, not any power, or height or depth, nor any created thing, can 
ever come between us and the love of God made visible in Christ Jesus our Lord” 
(Romans 8:39). It is obvious that here Paul, in a certain sense, is “playing with the 
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different literal and metaphorical meanings of the term death. It would, however, be a 
mistake to spell out all these meanings and to disconnect them, because it is just Paul’s 
intention to show their interconnectedness.14
By so emphatically making the ritual of baptism symbolize a decisive turning 
point in a human life—a real rebirth (John 3: 1-8)—an unprecedented latitude is created 
for freedom with regard to our collective and individual past, and a perspective of another 
future is offered. In this way the ritual of baptism shows that only that person to whom 
this latitude, vis-à-vis his own past and future, is granted is truly free. If our past is fixed, 
we shall have to carry it like a millstone around our neck as long as we live, and that is the 
end of our freedom. If our future is fixed, that is also the end of our freedom, and all that 
is left to us is to follow the course of life that was set by others. In baptism it becomes 
clear to what extent past and future are connected to each other. Not until our past has 
been cleansed does our real future open. The process which this opening creates is death, 
i.e. death to sin. Thus the essence of the whole history of salvation in Christ, and therefore 
also that of the Christian, lies hidden in a nutshell in baptism.
The Impact of Baptism
The far-reaching social consequences of this approach to baptism have received 
far too little consideration up to now. Usually baptism is viewed as merely an initiation 
through which one becomes a member of a church. In the case of adult baptism, it is more 
clearly a mark in the life of the baptized person, but even then the meaning of baptism is 
mainly sought in the personal experience of conversion, which is not linked any further to
the person’s experience of freedom. That is a missed opportunity, because the social 
consequences of such an experience of baptism—i.e. as an experience of freedom—could 
be major.
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The churches are primarily themselves to blame for the comparative lack of 
reflection about the important role which baptism could play in our psychological and 
social experience of baptism. They have themselves limited baptism to a ‘rite of passage’ 
without any further necessary consequences, in spite of the fact that the theology of 
baptism itself encompasses far broader perspectives as is evident from many magnificent 
baptismal prayers and hymns that often date from the time of the early church. Especially 
in the so-called established churches, where infant baptism means little more than a sort 
of registration of birth, there is a drastic reduction of the meaning of baptism. The 
Christian education about baptism must be more strongly focused on a new way of life—
a new lifestyle—not only in the case of adult baptism, but in the case of infant baptism as 
well. Without this education the church itself is the first which undermines its own 
message of rebirth. 
The separation between a so-called baptism through water and baptism through 
the Spirit, which took shape early in the tradition of the church and which found 
expression in two separate rituals, i.e. baptism through water and unction and/or laying 
on of hands (sometimes called confirmation), has left many less fortunate traces here. It 
creates the impression that the real change of life comes later and not with baptism, and 
that the Spirit is not active in the baptismal event. Baptism and renewal of life through 
the Spirit seem to have become two separate events. As opposed to the rather shallow 
practice of baptism which resulted from that separation, the Lima text speaks about the 
“new life” of the baptized as “sign of the Kingdom”; about “a new ethical orientation 
under the guidance of the Holy Spirit” and about “ethical implications which not only call 
for personal sanctification, but also motivate Christians to strive for the realization of the 
will of God in all realms of life (Rom. 6:9ff., Gal. 3:27-28; I Peter 2:21-4:6)”.15
Let us briefly illustrate with just two examples how (literally) pioneering—not 
only on an individual level, but also in broader social contexts—it can be if the possibility 
of change as a result of the liberating effect of baptism is seriously taken into 
consideration. Until the present day it is considered usual in international relations to 
remember old offenses for years, if not for centuries. It is only very rarely that a ‘break’ 
from the past is affected. And often that can only be done through an explicit gesture
such as a ritual that sometimes even looks somewhat like a baptismal ritual. 
That was, for example, the case when, during an official state visit to Poland in 
the context of his ‘East policy’ in the 1970s, the German Chancellor Brandt knelt down at 
the grave of the unknown soldier in Warsaw (Poland). Through that gesture of mortifica-
tion—mortification (penance) is traditionally the most important, indispensable mental 
attitude for baptism—Brandt consciously raised the relationship between Germany and 
Poland to a different level from that of the usual do ut des (‘I give so that you may give’). 
In so doing, Brandt correctly performed a ‘new’ act in the New Testament sense of the 
word kainos, which means: “not previously present” or “unknown”.16
The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission under the leadership of 
Bishop Tutu in South Africa can be regarded as a similar, impressive attempt at breaking 
the pull of the (sinful) past.17
Usually, however, the political métier is the exact opposite of what is indicated as 
the essence of baptism in the New Testament: the creation of new relations between 
reborn, renewed people. The biblical concept of freedom pre-eminently finds expression 
in the expectation of this newness. After all, without the possibility of something new 
there can be no form of freedom. Then there is only bondage to what is old and long 
since fixed. It is especially that fixation on what has historically developed that is broken 
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Cf. P. Meiring, Chronicle of the Truth Commission: A Journey Through the Past and Present –
Into the Future of South Africa (Johannesburg: Cape Diem Books, 1999). For a description of the 
basic assumptions of this truth commission about the way in which the Netherlands deals with its 
wars and colonial past see R. Dorsman et al., Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa and the 
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time and again at decisive moments in the Bible. Thus we hear the prophet Isaiah 
exclaim: “No need to recall the past, no need to think about what was done before. See, I 
am doing a new deed, even now it comes to light; can you not see it?” (Isaiah 43:18-19). 
And hence, time and again Jesus is saying: “You have learnt how it was said to our 
ancestors:  But I say this to you: ” (Matt. 5:17-48). Without this belief in the 
possibility of change in the social and cultural order in which people live, the prophetic 
vision of the Messianic reign and the New Testament proclamation of the kingdom of 
God are unthinkable. 
Baptism and the Kingdom of God
However much debate there may have been about the priority of the present (the 
‘already’) or the future (the ‘not yet’) of the New Testament references to the kingdom, in 
both cases those references exert a strong relativization of any tendency to make an 
absolute of what exists. For in both cases, the expectation is that either in the present or in 
the future a great deal is going to change. The kingdom of God is always something 
different from any social utopia to be realized by us. Whether we understand the coming 
kingdom as already present, still future or apocalyptic, it is never something that can 
simply be constructed by us. Although in the 1970s utopia and kingdom sometimes 
threatened to come dangerously close, in the 1980s the realization of a certain distance 
began to glimmer through again. In the 1990s there was even a tendency in the reflection 
on the kingdom of God to push any moment of completion into the background. This, 
however, appeared to be an overreaction to a previous overemphasis on the historical 
dimension of the kingdom of God in the theology of the 1970s.
By placing the expectation of this kingdom within the perspective of a theology 
of baptism, from the very beginning the New Testament removed any reckless aspect 
from this expectation and thus gave it its much-needed breathing space. Hence, humility 
is one of the most central characteristics of those who expect the kingdom of God, as 
Jesus tells his audience when asked how they could ever inherit this kingdom themselves 
(Matt. 25:31-46). This humility also has a social dimension. That social dimension has to 
do with the way in which they mortify themselves not only before God but also before 
one another. It is only out of this solidarity in humility that baptism can be spoken about 
in the words of the Lima text as a “sign of the kingdom:”
Baptism initiates the reality of the new life given in the midst of the present world. 
It gives participation in the community of the Holy Spirit. It is a sign of the 
Kingdom of God and of the life of the world to come. Through the gifts of faith, 
hope and love, baptism has a dynamic which embraces the whole of life.18
Because of the central place which penance has traditionally occupied in the ritual of 
baptism, any confusion with all those social utopias which, especially in the twentieth 
century, have left such a trail of corpses behind them is precluded. Any Promethean tint 
is alien to good baptismal theology, however much theology, especially in the 1970s 
when it was in the grip of socialist ideals, sometimes barely managed to resist the appeal 
of this myth. Rather, in baptism Christianity expresses the awareness that one is not in the 
world without a sinful past and therefore one is not without sinful ancestry either. We are 
never a tabula rasa.
Although such a sense of realism does not diminish the desire for another, better 
world, it does remove any naiveté that we might have about it. It makes us realize that 
that evil does not always only lurk in others, but also in ourselves. Over the past few 
decades some philosophers such as e.g. Leszek Kolakowski have not tired of pointing out 
to Christians the humanizing effect of the doctrine of (original) sin, so wrongly maligned 
by so many Christians.19 In former times Christians were often blamed for their assumed 
pessimistic image of humankind. The Calvinists were especially referred to because of 
question 8 of Sunday 3 of their Heidelberg Catechism.20 This critique was sometimes so 
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Several topical philosophers are convinced of the fact that it is more realistic to 
entertain a pessimistic than an optimistic image of humankind and that a more optimistic 
approach only can be justified when a society knows how to deal with sinners. In this 
regard, it cannot be stressed enough that the radical break with the past implied in 
baptism is a totally different one from that what was propagated in many, sometimes 
‘realized’ utopias. The break with the past in e.g. the French, Russian or Chinese 
(Cultural) Revolution had nothing to do with the confession of guilt regarding the 
individual past with which this break traditionally goes hand in hand in the Christian 
liturgy of baptism. The latter is a repentant acceptance of one’s own life history and the 
former always a form of settling scores with the sinful past of others. The doctrine of 
original sin, however, can have a twofold salutary effect. It keeps us both from 
overconfidence and despair. It prevents us from being utopian about human dreams of a 
perfect society and from falling into despair over the evident moral failures of individuals 
and societies.21
Besides the radical way in which Christian people profess to have broken with 
their own past through baptism, they are also thoroughly aware of the fact that baptized 
people are not saints. The references to the simul iustus ac peccator and the phenomenon 
of penance, understood as a continuous existential return to one’s own baptismal experi-
ence of submersion and resurrection, bear witness to this.
This sense of realism does not need to have a fatalistic effect. The history of two 
thousand years of Christianity shows that its greatest social influence has not been in 
stimulating forms of social utopias, secularized or not, but in building up the care of the 
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genocide in the last century, be prepared to give another answer than the authors of this 
catechism? 
21 K.Ward, Religion and Human Nature (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1998), 185.
sick, the elderly and the poor, the development of agriculture, and the founding of 
schools and universities. All these activities would not have been possible without the 
expectation of the ‘new’ and without the notion of another world. It is obvious that 
currently all these activities are no longer typical Christian activities. It is a challenge to 
articulate what currently is the main Christian moral responsibility. One of the main 
theses of our contribution is that Van de Beek’s article is a challenging effort to it, but his 
approach could be more intrinsically connected with the core of the theology of baptism. 
BAPTISM AND JUSTIFICATION
The willingness to take up new things is anchored in the theology of baptism. Therefore,
it makes sense to search for new ways in which the essence of that theology can be 
expressed. The core of the theology of baptism is expressed in the duality of repentance 
and rebirth. At first the words repentance and rebirth appear to mainly refer to human 
decisions, and thus to fit closely with what is the general view of baptism, i.e. that people, 
parents or candidates for baptism decide to have their children baptized or to be baptized. 
Then the whole emphasis is usually on that human decision. However, the words 
repentance and rebirth clearly express more. They presuppose that one turns and converts 
to something that one has not created by oneself and, in turn, that one becomes a 
different, reborn person through a power that comes from elsewhere. Just as humans do 
not produce their own birth, they do not effect their own rebirth. They are themselves 
actively and totally involved, but it is a process that is initiated elsewhere, “from above,”
as Jesus says in his conversation with Nicodemus (John 3:3).
Because of baptism’s character as a gift, this sacrament—together with the 
Lord’s Supper—has been viewed as one of the most expressive symbolizations of the 
essence of the doctrine of justification. After all, the core of the doctrine of justification—
forgiveness given sola gratia—is also the core of the theology of baptism and the Lord’s 
Supper. However, in these two sacraments, it also becomes clear that this divine gift of 
grace requires a human answer. That is why the Lima text discusses baptism’s character 
as “both God’s gift and our human response”.22
In this context it is significant that Berkouwer, who frequently uses the notion 
‘correlation’ for this dual character of gift and answer, describes the scope of that notion 
most accurately in his studies on justification and on the sacraments. On this correlation 
he notes: 
The correlation between faith and promise, faith and justification does not become a 
divine monologue in which man is a mere telephone through which God addresses 
Himself . The mystery of the correlation is apparent, however, only when it really 
embraces the reality of human existence. The miracle of grace occurs in the act or 
attitude of faith, the faith that is roused by the Holy Spirit. With this sola gratia is 
not spurned; it is verified.23
In this connection it may not even be such a bad idea to speak of the religious attitude in 
mind here in terms of a talent for faith. After all, this word expresses, on the one hand,
the gift-character of faith—talent as aptitude, gift, charisma—but, on the other hand, also 
refers to one’s own active participation: a talent must also be developed. Having or not 
having a certain talent is often spoken about with a degree of equanimity and indolence. 
Biblically speaking, however, that is an unjustifiable attitude. In the first place, because 
we often do not know what hidden talents we have. We do not yet know who we shall be. 
Often, we do not discover our talents until we are somewhat advanced in age. And, in the 
second place, the biblical call to make the most of one’s talents applies to this as well: 
that is, contribute actively to what we have freely received (Matthew 25:14-30).
INCULTURATON: BETWEEN CONFIRMATION AND NEGATION 
What holds true in regard to the individual believer also holds true for the process of 
inculturation as a whole. In the question of the relationship of continuity and 
discontinuity in baptism, we can also involve the inculturation event. In 1989 the General 
Council of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches made the following statement 
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regarding this relation: “The Gospel must not be used to promote a ‘levelling-out’ of 
culture, everything the same everywhere.”24 The report acknowledges that the Gospel 
illuminates every culture, that it holds every culture, as it were, up against the light of the 
proclamation of Christ. But the report also acknowledges that, up to a point, every culture 
illuminates our understanding of the Gospel: “Different cultures can perceive in the 
Gospel that which other cultures had failed to perceive.”25
In fact, we refer here to a double process of transformation.  On the entering site, 
the Gospel, and the receiving site, the culture, something happens. The Gospel changes 
the receiving culture, but the receiving culture also adds something to the Gospel. From 
the moment that Jesus was called Lord (kyrios) the concept of lordship changed, but the 
image of Jesus changed as well. The same holds true for what is currently happening in,
for example, Africa when Christians call Jesus their ancestor, healer, chief, king, etc. It 
changes their ideas of an ancestor, healer, chief and king, but it changes Jesus also. 
During the whole history of Christian doctrine we can observe these kind of changes in 
such a process of double transformation. It will be clear that this phenomenon concerns 
the relation of continuity and discontinuity as well.
Instead of speaking about continuity and discontinuity, we could also speak about 
Incarnation and Cross and Resurrection. Incarnation implies that God wants to live with 
us (John.1:14).  That means that God wants to take on a cultural vestment.  Where 
Incarnation stands for the given of that cultural vestment, Cross and Resurrection stand 
for the nature of that vestment. Cross and Resurrection are models for the death and 
resurrection with Christ—an event that is symbolized in the baptismal ritual.  We die to 
our old Adam and rise as reborn people with Christ, our second Adam.  Only the one who 
is prepared to lose himself is prepared to find himself, says Jesus (Mark 8:35; John 
12:24).  It is expected of faith that this experience is not only made at the time of baptism, 
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but at every moment of one’s life.  Thus, baptism always refers to a critical purifying 
process—a catharsis.  While Incarnation stands for affirmation, Cross and Resurrection 
stand for self-loss and for finding oneself through losing oneself. 
Incarnation cannot be discussed without speaking about Cross and Resurrection. 
Indwelling (Incarnation) finds nothing without a change on the entering and receiving site 
and change (Cross and Resurrection) does not find a place without solidarity 
(affirmation). Outside of this moment of interaction, no culture can unveil something 
about Jesus.  In this process of double transformation, however, account must be 
taken of new and creative syntheses.
Presently, the center of gravity of Christendom has moved to the southern 
hemisphere. That is due to a lively and creative cultural application process. The process 
of inculturation is also often named contextualization.  That is especially believed about 
the social-political dimension of this process.  What will this process yield?  What can be 
expected from the new inculturation of the meaning of Jesus in non-Western cultures?  
Church growth?  Sometimes that appears to be the undertone of many explanations of 
Western as well as non-Western theologians about the inculturation of the Gospel in the 
non-Western world.  If Christianity had adapted more to Asian culture, for example, then 
it would have had many more roots in Asia….is the tenor of many arguments.
The plausibility of that argument cannot always be exhibited.  In Japan an unique 
Japanese theology developed in the 1950s (after the Second World War), but the theology 
did not practice a collective power.  Only one percent of the Japanese population is 
Christian. In Korea Christian theology has a strong Western character, especially in large 
churches, and after the Second World War more than 25 percent of the population 
became Christian.  Obviously other factors played a part in that.
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If church growth is not the direct response of a successful inculturation and 
therefore cannot be the direct goal, then what is?  A better form of Christianity?  Another 
Asia, Africa and Latin America?  Can we see any indication of it?
The Congolese, Roman Catholic theologian Metena M’nteba cast this question in 
an article with the beautiful title, “Inculturation in the “Third Church”: a Godly Pentecost 
or a Revenge of the Culture?” By the ‘Third Church,’ he meant the African church 
following out from the original Oriental church (the ‘First Church’) and mainly formed 
by the Western church as the ‘Second Church.’ Is this formation of a real African church 
to be seen as a legitimate result of Pentecost or should the old African cultures now seize 
this as their chance to take the strange interloper in hand as the ‘revenge of the culture?’
Has—as M’nteba asks—the Western inculturation made the meaning of Jesus in 
the West more Christian in the sense of the West being more social and peaceful (during 
the last 2000 years)?  Has it drastically changed the Western culture?26  This has been a 
vehement debate concerning the all or nothing Christian character of the Western culture 
that has raged in Europe and North America for decades.  Should the culture thank the 
Enlightenment that it was wrestled out of the grip of the church and Christendom or is the 
Enlightenment a fruit of Christianity?27  That is an endless discussion that often 
degenerates into a trivial question of whether we can bring the desires and burdens of our 
cultural achievements in connection to Christianity. 
In any case, that debate makes it clear that the fruit of the inculturation of the 
Gospel in the West is disputed.  In view of this one occasion of a bad example, can we 
cherish higher expectations in respect to other continents?
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Modesty appears necessary here—a modesty that has to do with the question of 
how far the function of religion has to do with the improvement of the world.  One could 
also argue the other side:  Governments must improve the world and religions must show 
people on the verge of despair or hope in reference to their own deeds.
More significantly, it appears the reason that we, along with M’nteba, do not only 
concentrate on the question of examples of an Africanizing or Asianizing of Christianity
in respect to new inculturations, but on the question about the existential experience of 
the Gospel in Africa and Asia.  It has to do with the place that Cross and Resurrection can 
take in an individual’s life and in the community as a whole.  From Jesus’ own lifestyle it 
appears, perhaps too painfully, that a life that is determined by Cross and Resurrection is 
not measured by success or failure. Therefore, the two-in-one of affirmation (Incarnation) 
and negation (Cross and Resurrection) has much to do with Revelation: with the 
surprising disclosure of what is, so far, the unknown and unprepared. It might be that our 
affirmations then turn out to be strongly criticized and that our denials be overruled by 
God’s affirmations. 
Thus, every form of contextualization of the Gospel shall always be characterized 
through the same mental attitude that also characterizes the individual worshipper during 
baptism.  Such a mindset frees us from every form of convulsiveness that leads to an 
over-rating or under-rating of the current, extensive process of contextualization of the 
Gospel.  Whenever the simul justus et peccator may also become heard here, we do not 
attempt to recreate the ‘Christian’ wheel, but we are also not ashamed of the conviction 
that some unmistakable time and place bound forms of inculturation cannot be damaged 
by time and also apply to other contexts. Against both extremes—renewing and 
conservative impulse—is the abasement that baptism calls us to, the most adequate 
attitude. Only this attitude can give an adequate answer to the question we placed on the 
first page of this contribution. The role which the context can play in contextual theology 
is exactly the same role which our personal integrity plays in baptism. Although we die 
and rise with Christ, our personal integrity is not destroyed. Or—in a theologically better 
formulation—just because we die and rise with Christ, our personal integrity is saved by 
God. Hence, the Presbyterian, Ghanaian theologian Kwame Bediako speaks of “integrity 
in conversion.”28 Applied to the role of the context in contextual theology, it means that 
only when a context, as it were, is prepared to die and rise with Christ, it can play its 
illuminating role in the proclamation of the Gospel. 
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Summary:
It is not simple to write about contextual theology in relation to the theme of this volume: 
religion without ulterior motives. In current contextual theology the strength of this form 
of theology is, after all, correctly seen in its embeddedness in and contribution to an 
existing culture.  Of course, this does not imply an uncritical adoption of that culture, but 
a form of adaptation will certainly always be discussed.  Otherwise there is only a hostile 
confrontation. So, the point of issue is always the role which religion can play in a certain 
culture. Is that the same as the ‘instrumentalisation’ Bram van de Beek is liberation 
theology blaming for in his article on ‘Religion without ulterior motive’? That will be the 
main question to be answered in this contribution: What’s the role of the context in 
contextual theology? We approach this question from the position that the continuity and 
discontinuity that is spoken about in Christian baptism supplies the outstanding pattern 
from which we can speak about the characteristics of the Christian faith in the midst of a 
number of various contexts. We fully agree with Bram van de Beek’s emphasis on the 
meaning of baptism as main characteristic of Christian life. In the elaboration of the
impact of baptismal renewal in our topical life, however, the differences between us will 
be turn out.   
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